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APOCALYPSE NOW DOES THE MATRIX: ANTHROPIC
ADVENTURES FROM DOOMSDAY TO SIMULATION.
Alasdair Richmond
Following on from Nick Bostrom's discussion of the
Doomsday argument, Alasdair Richmond considers
how anthropic reasoning can lead from Doomsday
to some odd conclusions about computation and our —i
place in reality. =j#
The philosophy of explanation can yield strange arguments -Q
and this paper looks at two of them, the Doomsday and Simu- 3 '
lation Arguments. ^
One popular view says a good explanation should make £
whatever you're trying to explain appear more probable, or 3
typical, or more the sort of thing you would expect. Applying 3
this principle, all else being equal, you should expect to be in ®
a fairly probable or typical location for creatures like yourself. ^
For example: carbon chemistry is the largest single branch of g
the subject. Why? Carbon offers more bonding-opportunities .
than any other element. If you're going to build complex physi- ho
cal structures, having something like carbon around seems
a good start. If observers like us require complex structures
(brains, nervous systems, etc.), and carbon is better for build-
ing such structures than anything else, it's not surprising we
find ourselves living somewhere carbon can exist. Likewise, if
observers like us only thrive in a restricted range of tempera-
tures, it's not surprising you and I are (respectively) reading
and typing this article on a temperate planet and not (e.g.)
inside a star. (If you're reading this article inside a star, please
let me know.)
Suppose you think there's a link between (e.g.) being car-
bon-based and being able to carry out conscious functions.
This theory has the advantage that it would make your loca-
tion as a carbon-based observer more probable, or typical.
Likewise, we know the human body needs metals like iron and
copper. Seemingly metals are only made in bulk inside stars,
and hence only get distributed when their parent stars grow
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old and explode as supernovae. So, metal-requiring organisms
like us should only expect to live after several generations
of stars have passed. Observe the night sky and you'll find
stars of all ages. We don't live in the universe's early days
when stars were new and of similar ages. And this too isn't
coincidental. The early universe was short on metal-scattering
supernovae, and hence wasn't friendly to creatures like us.
o The above are 'anthropic' arguments. Physicist Brandon
^ Carter coined the name 'Anthropic Principle' to denote the
restrictions that our nature as observers set on the kind of
Q> physical conditions we are likely to observe. Anthropic ef-
_2 fects appear everywhere from cosmology to chemistry. (N.B.
^ 'Anthropic' involves no special reference to humanity - argu-
> ments like the above apply to any observers.) Besides physical
O conditions, there are anthropic reasonings about our location
y in time, viz. the Doomsday Argument'. This argument (also
Q- inspired by Carter) says: taking into account your location in
$= human history, you should look with greater favour on the
•£ hypothesis that human history is almost over.
•< How could such a controversial conclusion follow from
"O considering your location in history? It seems likely that the
O population explosion of the last few centuries has meant that
E a fair percentage of all the people who have ever lived are
Q alive now. Some estimates suggest our contemporaries may
2 be 10% of the all-time human population. If humanity became
extinct tomorrow, our contemporaries will also be about 10%
of all the people there ever will have been. Imagine every hu-
man receives a numbered birth rank, (so the first human born
has birth-rank #1, the second birth-rank #2, etc.). If roughly
10% of all people who have ever lived are alive now, and the
world's present population is c. six billion, then all living hu-
mans have birth-ranks in the vicinity of sixty billion. Imagine
humanity survives until there comes a time when the all-time
human population is six trillion, (i.e. one hundred times bigger
than now). In that case, humans with birth-ranks at (or below)
sixty billion will be unusually early - occupying only the first
1% of the all-time human total. However, if we all became
extinct overnight, then humans with birth-ranks at (or below)
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sixty billion would be all of humanity. On one hypothesis
('Doom Deferred'), all humans up to now are only a fraction
of all humanity; on another hypothesis ('Doom Soon'), we are
practically all the people there will ever be.
Doomsday's great exponent, John Leslie, illustrates it thus:
write your name on a slip of paper and drop it into an urn.
Shake the urn and draw out names. You have two theories
about how many names the urn contains: ten names or a —i
million. Assuming the draw was random, which theory should 5*
you favour if your name is drawn third? Surely the 'ten names' *"
theory - a random draw from only ten names seems much -Q
more likely to yield your name quickly than a random draw ^*
from a million names. Note the precise numbers involved don't ^
matter - in all cases, you should favour the lowest population <£
consistent with your evidence. (See Leslie's The End of the 3
World: The Science and Ethics of Human Extinction, 1998.) 3
Doomsday makes two key assumptions: i) your birth-rank ^
is randomly selected, and ii) the probability of your receiving ^
the birth-rank you do is inversely proportional to the postulated O
all-time human population. Thus, if you think the all-time hu- .
man total will be six trillion, you should think your having your GO
particular birth-rank is a hundred times less likely than it would
be if the all-time human total is sixty billion. (Your birth-rank
can only equal, or be less than, the birth-rank of the very last
human. If you're human, you can't be born after the last hu-
man ever born.)
Note the importance of randomness - the argument col-
lapses if you think there's something fishy about the draw so
your name is more likely than others to appear. Like other
anthropic arguments, Doomsday assumes you're pretty un-
exceptional, considered qua random human being. Of course,
we're all unique in various ways, but we're also fairly typical
in various ways too. The point is: we tend to favour explana-
tions that make our location or history unexceptional rather
than exceptional. An example: if mind is purely material, it's
conceivable a mind like mine could spring into existence
fully-formed through pure happenstance. Maybe lightning
struck some chemicals dumped in a swamp and triggered
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spontaneous cellular activity that issued in me, complete
with false memories of a life I never had. This non-evolution-
ary 'swamp man' story 'explains' my physical and mental
make-up. However, it's a poor explanation that makes me so
bizarrely atypical. All else being equal, I won't buy the 'swamp
man'story unless I find powerful evidence in its favour. Hence,
Doomsday is not saying we should treat ourselves as random,
CN undifferentiated humans in every respect. Rather, Dooms-
^ day argues anthropically: favour explanations that make you
^ probable unless you've very good reason to think otherwise.
0) Doomsday lecture-audiences often respond 'But I'm unique'.
_2 Indeed, experience suggests 68% of all people first exposed
^ to Doomsday retort by asserting their own uniqueness, thereby
> belying their own uniqueness. (Operational self-refutation?)
rj Being a beautiful snowflake of a person, unique and irreplace-
y able, doesn't immunise you against anthropic effects. Hands
Q- up everybody who's argon-based... No takers? You may be
£= more typical than you'd like to think.
•£ Like all anthropic inferences, Doomsday does not ask you
< to discount existing evidence so your location may appear
"O more probable. I live in Scotland, whose population the 2006
O census put at 5,116,900. China's population is estimated at
E 1,321,851,888, (July 2007, http://wikitravel.org/en/China).
(j Thus, China's population is (roughly) 258.3 times bigger
£ than Scotland's. Should I conclude I actually live in China?
No, because I would then have to discount much of my exist-
ing empirical evidence, (e.g. my office's view of Edinburgh
Castle). Anthropic reasoning does not say: think yourself prob-
able at all costs - rather, it says: all else being equal, favour
hypotheses that make your existing evidence more probable
rather than less.
Doomsday is not refuted by saying that earlier historical
periods might have made similar inferences. Suppose a cen-
turion in Eboracum (York) c. AD 200, reasons thus: 'World
population has doubled since 500 BC, the Antonine Wall's
defunct, you can drive chariots through bits of Hadrian's Wall,
our technological lead over the Persians is narrowing, the
Picts and Teutons won't stay quiet, new catapults and ballis-
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tae keep proliferating; overall I give humanity until AD 300 at
most.' Our centurion is surely wrong - centuries later, humanity
survives. Doesn't this refute Doomsday? Two points: i) Like
Hume's Indian Prince, the centurion may reason correctly but
to a false conclusion. We know the centurion actually is an
unusually early human, and unusual people can easily think
themselves more typical than they are. (If you win a lottery,
don't assume everybody won.) ii) The centurion's evidential —i
basis is not ours, so we can legitimately give extinction much g*
higher starting-probability. Biochemical weapons and multi- * "
megaton warheads threaten slaughters orders of magnitude -Q
beyond anything ancient Rome managed. (Although what ^"
befell Carthage was bad enough.) ^
A Doomsday critic (I name no names) says Doomsday <£
should only trouble atheists, because theists expect eternal 3
life to succeed (Earthly) extinction. However: i) This is no sort 3
of refutation - an injunction not to worry about extinction is ^
not a challenge to Leslie's reasoning; and ii) theists can be ^
just as Doom-phobic as anybody else. Maybe anyone dying g
in mortal sin is damned. Extinction, especially if rapid, might ,
damn unshriven billions who might otherwise be saved - per- GO
haps including you. Extinction followed by mass damnation is
not a consoling prospect.
So, in a nutshell, Doomsday says: once you take into ac-
count your location in human history, you ought to believe
extinction is more probable than you first thought. Doomsday
does not specify how probable extinction is - rather than derive
a specific probability (e.g. 96%) for extinction, Doomsday says
you should increase whatever your starting-probability hap-
pens to be. Thus, if you initially think Doom is very unlikely,
you might still think that even after considering Doomsday
Arguments. So, Doomsday is not a prophecy of irrevocable
and inevitable doom -you can accept Leslie's reasoning and
still think humanity has a long future. Likewise, you might re-
ject Doomsday (e.g. because you reject the probability ideas
above) but believe our days are numbered on other grounds,
(e.g. ozone depletion, nuclear proliferation, galloping obesity,
bird 'flu, Pop Idol - pick your own Armageddon).
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But there are odder anthropic horizons yet. Many philoso-
phers think the functional aspects of the mind are constitutive
of consciousness. Provided a system instantiates the right
functions, it can be fully conscious, regardless of its physical
composition. Not what minds are made of, but what they do,
is the key. Perhaps mind is to brain as computer programmes
are to their supporting hardware, so you can run the same
•M- consciousness on different computational vehicles. This 'sub-
0 0
 strate-independence' view of mind implies you may not be
w able to deduce much about your substrate from the mere fact
0) of being conscious. However, suppose you don't know what
.2 substrate you have but think 99% of observer-substrates are
^ carbon-based. You should accordingly think your substrate
> is carbon-based, unless you have good evidence otherwise.
O Likewise, if you believe most observers have sulphur-based
y substrates and you don't know what kind you have, expect to
Q. be sulphur-based. (You could of course be wrong but we're
^ discussing what beliefs you ought to have, or are justified in
"£ having. Alas, false beliefs can be justified.)
< Suppose you're a functionalist, who also thinks advanced
"D technology might permit fully-conscious simulations of human
O consciousness. Let's call fully-conscious simulations 'Sims'.
E (Cf. Brian Weatherson, 'Are You A Sim?', Philosophical Quar-
( j terly, 2003.) Computing power has grown for decades. In 1998,
£ I stored my PhD. on a 4-megabyte drive; in 2007, I save
these words on a 12-gigabyte drive - my PC-storage has risen
3,000-fold in nine years. We seem nowhere near the theo-
retical maxima for computing power, speed or efficiency yet.
Advanced civilisations may command computing resources
vastly beyond ours. (Cf. star-system-sized 'Matrioshka brains'
imagined by futurologists.) What might such 'posthumans' do
with such computational power? Judging by human experi-
ence, they might run many Sims. The computational require-
ments for running Sims must be huge but then so may be
posthuman resources. Assuming our recreational habits are
typical of computer-using beings (anthropic reasoning again),
posthumans probably run all manner of simulations, with as
much depth and complexity as their resources allow.
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If your experience is not an infallible guide to your substra-
tum, you might be a Sim and not know it. Substratum-discov-
eries need more than mere introspection. You can't intuit that
you're currently running on a carbon-based architecture - if
indeed you are. If you believe a) there are many more Sims
than non-Sims and b) your evidence doesn't reveal whether
or not you're a Sim, then you ought to believe you're a Sim,
i.e. you should favour the hypothesis that Sim-hood is where - i
you're at right now. This is the crux of Nick Bostrom's 'Simula- =j#
tion Argument', ('Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?', J"f
Philosophical Quarterly, 2003). Bostrom maintains his argu- -Q
ment differs in a key respect from Doomsday: if we don't know ^"
whether or not we're Sims we can regard ourselves plausibly ^
as random consciousnesses, but we do know our birth-ranks £
and hence cannot view ourselves as random humans. 3
Note Bostrom is not saying we're probably Sims. Rather, 3
he says: if you believe in functionalism and believe Sims out- ^
number non-Sims, then you should believe you're probably a ^
Sim. However, Bostrom's reasoning is compatible with other g
possibilities: 1) posthumans are rare (e.g. extinction prevents ,
most species reaching posthumanity); 2) posthumans run few co
Sims; 3) functionalism is false. But recall the argument's an-
thropic inspiration: if we attain Sim-technology, this would tell
heavily against options 1-3. Assuming we're typical computer-
users, our running Sims would be powerful evidence that we
are ourselves Sims. (This outcome would support functional-
ism, while telling against both the rarity of posthumans and
posthuman reluctance to run Sims.) So, if we run Sims, we
might suspect that reality is multi-layered, with our Sims being
Sims run by Sims (i.e. us), whose simulators in turn may be
Sims. (If functionalism is right, a correct simulation of a Sim
is itself a Sim.) Presumably, if the master-simulators at the
bottom of the pile have only finite resources, this regression
couldn't be infinite but it could be deep nonetheless.
Just as you can accept Bostrom's argument but reject your
Sim-hood, you can reject Bostrom's argument but still believe
you're a Sim. Maybe you've observed a computational 'glitch' in
your environment or you think your simulators have contacted
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you directly, (although don't embrace either explanation until
you've eliminated some alternatives first). Bostrom's conclu-
sion is actually disjunctive, (i.e. an either/or choice between
various options). An either/or conclusion is something Simula-
tion has in common with Doomsday. As Leslie insists, despite
its name, Doomsday is compatible with outcomes besides
extinction. Maybe humanity survives but in so different a form
o that our descendants don't belong in the same reference-
class as us. It's not clear that the all-time census of people
^ should include our hominid ancestors - perhaps our near-
CD descendants make some cognitive breakthrough which puts
_2 them into a different bracket again. Our descendants might
^ upload their minds onto computers and thereafter acquire
> new cognitive abilities simply by bolting-on new modules. (For
Q runaway computer-intelligence, see I. J. Good, 'Speculations
y Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine,' Advances in
Q- Computers, 1965.) Combining Doomsday with functionalism
^ might portend, not extinction, but extended human/machine
•£ symbioses. Some Transhumanists' cheerfully anticipate be-
< coming effectively immortal via such fusion. However, Tran-
"O shumanist practices may themselves be dangerous. If we
O lavish too many resources on indefinitely prolonging a few at
E the expense of securing basic needs for the many, extinction
"5 may claim us all. Let's worry about physical immortality once
£ everyone has drinking-water. Why should my bodily life extend
forever? Remember the anthropic moral: we're probably more
typical than we think. Being human, carbon-based and mortal
offers challenges enough. (Any ontological condition good
enough for Martin Luther King and Uma Thurman, to name
but two, seems good enough for me.)
Alternatively, joining Doomsday with Simulation might sug-
gest human extinction has already occurred, i.e. we aren't
carbon-based after all (and maybe never were). Computer
intelligence may have evolutionary advantages - more tolerant
of radiation and extremes of temperature, less reliant on air
and water. If you think computer intelligences predominate,
and/or most species only spend part of their history embodied,
you might be sceptical about being human. Or maybe such
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'Apocalypse Past' speculations are a reductio ad absurdum
of functionalism.
Generalising from human computer-use prompts hum-
bling thoughts. The Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence
(www.seti.org) offer screensavers that let your computer de-
vote spare computing capacity to sifting astronomical data.
Our lives may be some posthuman screensaver-equivalent,
run while our creator grabs a post-coffee. Ignominious Doom —i
looms if our creator's break finishes and all this spare comput- 5*
ing capacity goes back to work. Combining Doomsday and 7?
Simulation, maybe most Sims live in the last splurge of Sim- -Q
activity just before it all switches off... (Compare desperately 3"
e-mailing just before your Internet access runs out or frantically ^
finishing off an exam against the clock.) If a conscious being £
measures time-flow by the number of processes it carries out 3
per temporal unit, there seems no reason why Sims couldn't 3
experience subjective lifetimes in mere seconds of Simula- ®
tor-time. We might live 'longer' lives than our creators even if ^
there's no point in time at which we are alive and they aren't. g
(In the limit, Sim-time might even be infinite but simulator-time •
finite, making us immortal creations of mortal 'gods'.) GO
Philosophy needs thought-experiments, and science fiction
is a rich source. However, while I love SF and shamelessly
used the Matrix to grab your attention, I find the Matrix tril-
ogy dull, superficial and unpleasant - and significantly less
interesting than the Sim-world postulated by Bostrom. (Apoca-
lypse Now though is magnificent - not very anthropic but
an irresistible name-drop.) In the Matrix trilogy, virtual reality
simplifies things rather than the reverse: reality may have two
levels but it's pretty easy to tell a) which level is which and b)
who the bad guys are. I also dislike the trilogy's gestures at
mysticism. Proper mystics are well-rounded people, not gun-
happy narcissists. Despite the trilogy's 'spiritual quest' noises,
all it takes to solve Matrix-problems is squaring your jaw and
hitting things. Reality (virtual or not) just ain't like that. If you
prefer thought-provoking virtual reality fictions, I recommend
Christopher Priest's novels A Dream of Wessex (1977) and
The Extremes (1998), and David Cronenberg's film eXistenZ
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(1999). (Priest especially makes genuinely unsettling and
inventive use of simulated worlds.)
Are Sim-worlds like the Matrix? Yes and no. The trilogy's
'heroes' are not really Sims per se but normally-embodied
persons who are fed a systematic simulated world. The purely
computational Smith is more like a true Sim. (One rare inter-
esting twist in the trilogy's later instalments is Smith upload-
oo ing himself onto human brains, making him a carbon-based
0 0
 Sim.) The Matrix portrays one restricted kind of Sim-world.
Let's call unconscious simulations 'simulacra', so simulacra
O are computer-generated zombies, not Sims. In the Matrix, a
j2 few 'real' people (and machine-possessed baddies like Agent
Q5 Smith) live amid a large number of simulacra. Many Matrix
> simulated people are seemingly window-dressing. There's
O no reason to assume most Sims will live in Matrix-style
y simulations with only few Sims to many simulacra. Bostrom's
Q- argument suggests an altogether richer, multi-layered reality
^ whose different levels might be genuinely diverse yet filled
•£ with conscious beings throughout. For functionalists, a proper
< simulation of consciousness is itself conscious, and having a
"D computational substratum is no reason why you can't be fully
O conscious. Thus, we should respect Sims as persons, even if
E Sims make backup copies of themselves. (Sympathy for Agent
tj Smith? He's just trying to survive, albeit aggressively.) This last
2 isn't as frivolous a point as it may initially sound. Functional-
ism means backup copies might be conscious too. To deny
personhood and its concomitant rights to a conscious being
solely because it has a substratum unlike yours is effectively
tantamount to racism or speciesism.
Matrix fantasies seem psychologically and philosophically
unhealthy. ('I may be obscure in this delusory world but in
reality-at-large, I'm a shade-wearing superbeing - soon, these
simulacra shall call me Messiah.') Solipsistic power-fantasies
often take their owners off life's stage but sadly, such owners
don't always depart alone. Some Matrix fans once told me they
believed 99% of (so-called) 'other people' were simulacra. Not
knowing what response to make, I didn't reply, but pragmatism
suggests: On meeting things that behave like people, please
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assume they really are people, with inner lives and agendas
as valuable as yours. Treating simulacra like persons may
be foolish, but treating persons like simulacra is criminal. If in
doubt, treat the person-like as persons. Whatever blunts our
sensitivity to the human seems risky. (An argument against
virtual reality - not to mention android stress-dolls and sex-
toys?) Here multi-layer Bostrom-worlds differ significantly from
two-level Matrices. In Bostrom's world, no level can be sure it's —i
the basement so all levels face the possibility of censure from 5*
simulators further down. Thus, in Bostrom-worlds, individuals *"
and species alike have incentives to behave morally. So, for -Q
several philosophical and moral reasons, I'd rather this was 3*
a Bostrom-world than a Matrix. ^
Finally, do I accept Doomsday or Simulation? No - while I <£
don't accept all the criticisms levelled at them, ultimately I can't 3
buy either argument. (See my 'Recent Work: The Doomsday 3
Argument', Philosophical Books, 2006, and The Simulation ^
Argument & Simulation Hypotheses', Philosophy Through Sci- ^
ence Fiction, ed. Ryan Nichols, forthcoming 2008.) The refer- O
ence-class of human observers must be left deliberately vague ,
in order to support Doomsday conclusions and to preserve Go
our 'randomness' as humans. Most probabilistic inferences
seek to make their reference-classes more specific rather
than less and to use as much relevant information as possi-
ble in delimiting their reference-classes. For some purposes,
we can afford to keep our reference-classes fairly vague; in
life-and-death matters, we tend to fix our reference-classes
as accurately as we can. The chances of my being carbon-
based don't decline if I narrow my reference-class to Scottish
life-forms. However, my being Scots may affect my risk of coro-
nary heart-disease - in this case, a more inclusive reference
class might sharply change the probabilities, and hence my
indicated survival-strategy. Doomsday's probability assump-
tions also seem suspect, especially that one's birth-rank gets
less probable as the overall postulated population rises. This
strategy is one way of awarding birth-ranks probabilities but
other strategies seem equally plausible prima facie. Maybe a
larger human race affords more possibilities for being human,
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and thus raises your birth-rank's probability. (Although neither
probability-setting strategy seems compelling taken singly.)
Overall, Doomsday seems both more anthropic and more
robust than Simulation. (Even discounting my strictly armchair
assessments that human extinction is sadly plausible but 'Ma-
trioshka brain' techno-optimism is so much fiddling while Rome
bums.) Anthropic reasoning tries to counteract the seemingly
o innate human tendencies to anthropocentrism and self-infla-
tion in assessing our place in nature, whereas Simulation's
^ picture of a stage-managed world is counter-anthropic and
<b almost calculated to put us back in the centre of existence. The
.2 leap from anthropic considerations to a multi-layer hierarchy
^ of simulating Sims seems suspicious. Ramifying reality thus
> seems deeply inflationary if undertaken on so slight an evi-
O dential basis, and drastically restricts the appeal of one leg of
y Bostrom's disjunction. (It might be a different story if we started
Q- getting messages from our simulators or somehow detected
£ a computational substratum beneath our world's sensory ap-
•£ pearances. However, I suspect nothing of the kind has been
< observed hitherto and that it would take astonishingly good
TJ evidence to make such hypotheses compelling. A neo-Hume
O would have a field day with testimony to such events.)
E Doomsday uses a reference-class that seems vague but
"5 broadly justifiable - after all we already have to use a rough-
£ and-ready concept of 'human being' for many purposes.
However, the Simulation reference-class seems both vague
and contrived - as though the argument pre-dated its refer-
ence-class and not vice-versa. Simulation also invites ques-
tions about how belief supervenes on evidence and how
Sims might keep scepticism at bay. The smooth running of a
Sim-world seems to leaves Sims in a position compounded
of large measures of contrivance, surveillance and epistemic
luck. Anthropic reasoning is subtle and often highly persuasive
but it has yielded many applications more compelling than
Doomsday and Simulation.
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